The tool for predicting tile damage was known as 'Crater', described by several NASA representatives in press briefings as not actually a software program but rather a statistical spreadsheet of observed past flight events and effects. ĭamage-prediction software was used to evaluate possible tile and RCC damage. Details of the DOD's unfulfilled participation with Columbia remain secret retired NASA official Wayne Hale stated in 2012 that 'activity regarding other national assets and agencies remains classified and I cannot comment on that aspect of the Columbia tragedy'. The CAIB recommended subsequent shuttle flights be imaged while in orbit using ground-based or space-based DOD assets. NASA management did not honor the requests and in some cases intervened to stop the DOD from assisting. While the images were not guaranteed to show the damage, the capability existed for imaging of sufficient resolution to provide meaningful examination.
Engineers made three separate requests for Department of Defense (DOD) imaging of the shuttle in orbit to determine damage more precisely. In a risk-management scenario similar to the Challenger disaster, NASA management failed to recognize the relevance of engineering concerns for safety and suggestions for imaging to inspect possible damage, and failed to respond to engineers' requests about the status of astronaut inspection of the left wing.
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